IN THE MATTER OF PIRACY JURE GENTIUM.
Note on the Report of the Judicial Committee.
41
After perusing the above Report I find it
impossible to estimate what its exact effect is likely
to be on the Colonial Courts exercising criminal juris-
diction in respect of piracy jure gentium. The Judicial
Committee has now said that the definition of piracy
given by Sir Charles Hedges in his charge to the Grand
Jury in Dawson's case must be read secundum subjectam
materiam. In other words what was approved by the Board
in A.-G. for Hong Kong v. Kwok-a-Sing (1873) L.R. 5 P.C.
179 as a correct exposition of the law as to what consti-
tuted piracy jure gentium, is now not to be regarded as
exhaustive.
It seems to me that one of the difficulties
which may arise in minds of those who are called upon to
exercise criminal jurisdiction in the Colonies will
result from the fact that the Report proceeds upon the
lines expressed in the penultimate sentence of the Report
where it is said that: "A careful examination of the
subject shows a gradual widening of the earlier definition
of piracy to bring it from time to time more in consonance
with situations either not thought of or not in existence
when the older juris consults were expressing their
opinions".
It is not very evident quite how this 'gradual
widening' could on the particular question put to the
Board supply an answer, as frustrated attempts to commit
piratical robbery conceivably must have occurred in
ancient and well as in modern times.
Be that as it may however, as an Answer to
1.
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